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Hopes and concerns
When the electoral balance finally tilted decisively 
in favour of the Democrat candidate, Germany re-
sponded with clear relief. Amidst the coordinated 
wave of congratulations from European politicians 
on 7 November, Germany did not hide its joy at 
Biden’s victory. In her statement on 9 November, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel included heartfelt con-
gratulations not only to Biden but also to the new 
vice-president-elect Kamala Harris. At the same 
time, the absence of any mention of Donald Trump 
confirmed the high degree of irritation at the style 
of his politics, as well as the deterioration of bilat-
eral relations during his presidency. Critical opinion 
about the outgoing president was sealed by his 
comments after the election questioning whether 
his successor had been elected legitimately; in 
Berlin, these remarks were widely seen as a threat 
to social and political stability. The former foreign 
minister Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) claimed Trump was 
accountable for the fact that the US had ceased 
to serve as a role model as the Western democra-
cies’ leading nation1. German politicians fear the 
1 ‘Ex-Außenminister Gabriel über die USA: „Wer so tief 
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Germany hopes that Joe Biden’s upcoming presidency will contribute to restoring transatlantic bonds. 
It is pinning its hopes on both sides sharing a similar perception of the key challenges, the appreci-
ation of the importance of alliances, and on the US returning to the use of multilateral instruments. 
German-American relations will no longer be burdened by the confrontational rhetoric and strictly 
transactional approach which were typical of the outgoing president. However, the political change 
in the United States will not remove the differences of positions and interests that underlie the main 
disputes between Berlin and Washington. Moreover, given the fact that both Democrats and Republi-
cans were running neck and neck during the presidential race, Germany may modify its expectations 
with regard to the new American administration to become more realistic. German politicians have 
signalled their readiness to engage more in maintaining the partnership with the US, but whether 
they will be able to put these declarations into practice remains an open question, considering that 
elections to the Bundestag are due to be held next year. The main difficulty for Germany will be 
making adjustments in the area of security, mainly due to the German public’s reluctance to increase 
spending on defence. Coordination of policy towards China will be an equally important challenge.
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political, economic and social consequences of 
the deepening political polarisation in the United 
States, and more broadly, the weakening of liberal 
democracy in a systemic clash with authoritarian 
states. The ongoing change is seen as a serious test 
for the US. Close attention has been paid to the 
reactions of Republican Party’s representatives 
to Trump’s allegations that the election was held 
incorrectly, as well as the radicalisation of some 
of his supporters.
After four years of the ‘America First’ policy, 
Biden’s victory was clearly the preferred scenario 
in Germany. Hopes were pinned on his deep com-
mitment to transatlanticism and his outstanding 
experience, especially in foreign policy. The presi-
dent-elect is characterised by an especially strong 
understanding of the benefits of multilateralism 
and an appreciation of the importance of alliances 
in pursuing US interests. The Democrat candidate’s 
views were taken as a sign of an improvement in 
mutual relations.
The fact that the race between Biden and Trump 
during the presidential race was so close came as 
a surprise, and prompted German commentators 
to adopt more realistic forecasts and expectations. 
Considering the profound changes in US policy, it 
was not expected even in the preferred scenario 
of a Biden victory that the transatlantic relation-
ship would return to the status quo ante, but the 
broad support for Trump undermined hopes for 
normalisation in a form convenient to Germany. 
There is a growing conviction that – given both the 
deep social divides and the balance of power in 
the Congress – the president-elect will have a lim-
ited room for manoeuvre. This also applies in the 
sphere of foreign relations, which has likewise be-
come a subject of rivalry between Democrats and 
Republicans. At the same time, however, the two 
gespalten ist, fällt als Gestalter aus“’, Spiegel, 6 November 
2020, www.spiegel.de.
parties share very similar views on the issues that 
are in dispute with Germany and the EU (China, 
Iran, Nord Stream 2). Given these circumstances, 
the new presidential administration’s expecta-
tions towards America’s European partners will 
not differ significantly from Trump’s demands; 
they will just be expressed in a more friendly 
form. Moreover, German politicians reckon with 
the fact that, despite his interest in international 
issues, Biden may be forced to focus most of his 
attention and effort on the US’s internal affairs.
As a result, an improvement in the atmosphere in 
mutual relations is expected: “Everything suggests 
that with President Biden, rationality, predicta-
bility and a spirit of partnership will be brought 
back to transatlantic relations”2. Regardless of 
the frequently mentioned European dimension, 
Germany is above all interested in rebuilding its 
significance in US policy: it wants to be viewed as 
an equal partner. Germany may be supported in 
its efforts by Merkel’s long tenure as chancellor 
and the fact that she has known Biden since he 
served as vice-president alongside Barack Obama 
(2009–2017). Germany probably also expects some 
form of compensation from the new adminis-
tration for the deterioration of relations during 
Trump’s presidency, as well as gestures marking 
a new beginning, e.g. making an official visit as 
soon as possible (Trump only visited Germany 
during the G20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017).
Showing initiative
Trump’s presidency, which adopted a confron-
tational stance towards Berlin, provided a new 
context for Germany to reflect on the meaning 
of its partnership with the US. The growing cat-
alogue of differences in transatlantic relation-
ships has highlighted the costs and risks of the 
increasing distance between the two countries. 
At the same time, the limitations of German pol-
icy as regards actions taken separately from the 
United States, usually within the framework of 
2 N. Röttgen, ‘Joe Bidens Wahlerfolg rückt die USA wieder 
näher an Europa’, Handelsblatt, 8 November 2020, www.
handelsblatt.com.
German politicians admit that the 
renewal of the alliance also requires 
a change on the German, and more 
broadly, the European side.
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European co-operation, were made evident. The 
election of Biden is seen as an opportunity for 
mutually beneficial joint action. Chancellor Merkel 
has declared that a proven trans-Atlantic friend-
ship is necessary to face the key challenges of 
the pandemic, climate protection and terrorism, 
and also in order to maintain an open economy 
and free trade as the basis of prosperity on both 
sides of the Atlantic3. According to Olaf Scholz, 
Vice-Chancellor and Finance Minister, who is also 
the SPD’s candidate for the post of chancellor in 
the upcoming election, the US remains Europe’s 
closest partner and ally on the global scale4. Most 
vocal in emphasising the significance of transat-
lantic partnership has been the defence minister 
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer5.
According to German politicians, the election of 
Biden opens up a chance for the West to resume 
the previous spirit of team play. However, they 
admit that the renewal of the alliance also requires 
a change on the German, and more broadly, the 
European side. Merkel has highlighted the need 
for Germany to assume greater responsibility: the 
most important ally, the United States, legitimately 
expects both a stronger effort to ensure security 
and an international commitment to supporting 
its own beliefs. In this way the Chancellor showed 
understanding for the US’s long-held expectations 
in the field of security policy, which accumulated 
in Trump’s criticism on Germany’s failure to fulfil 
its obligation to allocate 2% of its GDP to defence. 
Kramp-Karrenbauer has been pressing for Ger-
many to meet its obligations as an ally towards 
the US, including at the federal budget level6. In 
turn foreign minister Heiko Maas (SPD) has stated 
that the increase in expenditure in this area will 
be a gradual process, and has emphasised that 
it is necessary to assume greater responsibility 
3 Pressestatement von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel nach den 
Wahlen in den USA, Die Bundeskanzlerin, 9 November 
2020, www.bundeskanzlerin.de.
4 O. Scholz,  ‘Wir werden Joe Biden beim Wort nehmen’, 
Spiegel, 7 November 2020, www.spiegel.de.
5 Rede anlässlich der Verleihung des Medienpreises der 
Steuben-Schurz-Gesellschaft, Bundeministerium der 
Verteidigung, 23 October 2020, www.bmvg.de; see also 
A. Kramp-Karrenbauer, ‘Europe still needs America’, Politico, 
2 November 2020, www.politico.eu.
6 Ibidem.
in foreign and security policy in Africa and the 
Middle East7. For his part, President Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier has appealed for German investments 
to strengthen Europe, which is necessary in order 
to maintain the US’s interest in it8.
Even before the vote in the US, Maas insisted that 
Germany was ready to invest in co-operation and 
become more engaged in the partnership, formu-
lating an offer of a new transatlantic beginning, 
a ‘New Deal’9. He also promised that specific 
proposals would be presented concerning the 
approach to China, climate protection and over-
coming the pandemic.
The offer of co-operation covering a wide range 
of areas and the declarations of commitment may 
have been presented not only to improve relations 
in the short term with the United States, which 
have been strained over the past four years, but 
also to place these relations on a new footing 
that will be resistant to political turmoil10. The 
multitude of topics in the renewed co-operation 
agenda Germany has proposed is intended to en-
able it to remain flexible about setting priorities 
(e.g. combating the pandemic, dealing with cli-
mate change), while at the same time pushing 
security policy or US preferences in formulating 
a shared stance on China onto the backburner. 
This proactive approach to shaping future co-op-
eration is also an expression of the expectation 
that Germany will be treated on equal terms as 
a partner, based on the belief that Biden needs 
alliances to enhance the US’s potential for action, 
7 ‘Außenminister Maas zum US-Wahlausgang: „Irgendwann 
muss auch Trump eine Entscheidung akzeptieren“’, Spiegel, 
8 November 2020, www.spiegel.de.
8 F.-W. Steinmeier,  ‘Deutschlands Chance’, Frankfurter All-
gemeine, 8 November 2020, www.faz.net.
9 ‘Außenminister Maas zur Wahl in den USA’, Pressemitteilung, 
Auswärtiges Amt, 7 November 2020, www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de.
10 T. Kleine-Brockhoff, ‘Wie Berlin Biden helfen kann’, Frank-
furter Allgemeine, 9 November 2020, www.faz.net.
Germany is hoping for a reorienta-
tion of the US climate policy, but 
Biden will have limited room for ma-
noeuvre as his party will not have 
a majority in the Senate.
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since the country is now weaker than it used to be 
in the past.
The program for rebuilding mutual 
relations
In his first telephone conversation with Merkel 
on 10 November, the president-elect reportedly 
expressed his interest in close co-operation to ad-
dress the common challenges of combating the 
pandemic, climate protection and global economic 
revival, and also declared his intention to renew 
transatlantic relations through co-operation with 
the EU and within NATO11.
From the German perspective, addressing the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular the United 
States’ resuming its involvement in the work of 
the World Health Organisation, may be a quick 
test to check whether transatlantic co-operation 
can be revived.
Similarly, high hopes are pinned on a possible 
shift in US climate policy, the US being the second 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases after China. 
Biden has announced that he will rejoin the Paris 
Climate Agreement and strive for climate neutrality 
by 2050. Investments supporting this goal should 
be a key element of the strategy for economic 
recovery in the post-pandemic period. Germa-
ny is counting that these declarations will have 
a political effect, hoping that this will encourage 
other countries to increase their efforts to reduce 
emissions. Furthermore, a positive impact is ex-
pected on co-operation between companies from 
both countries. Germany also believes that it is 
possible to start negotiations on creating a trans-
atlantic emissions trading system12. When it comes 
to legislation, however, the new president’s ability 
to reorient climate policy will remain limited as 
his party will not have a majority in the Senate.
Germany is moderately optimistic about the pros-
pects for economic co-operation during Biden’s 
11 ‘Biden bezeichnet Trumps Verhalten als „peinlich“’, Frank-
furter Allgemeine, 10 November 2020, www.faz.net.
12 O. Scholz, ‘Wir werden Joe Biden beim Wort nehmen’, 
op. cit.
presidency. It is assumed that he will not follow 
in the footsteps of his belligerent predecessor 
regarding trade policy, and that will translate 
into a better atmosphere of the negotiations – at 
the same time, however, criticism of Germany’s 
trade surplus will not cease. A key task for the 
new administration will be to deal with the re-
covery of the US economy after the pandemic 
crisis. The Democrats’ interest in retaining US 
public support during this period must be tak-
en into account, and so Germany assumes that 
protectionist measures will continue, along the 
lines of the ‘Buy American’ slogan used in Biden’s 
election campaign. Instead, Berlin is hoping for 
the functionality of the World Trade Organisation 
to be restored, particularly with regard to ending 
the blockade of nominations to the appellate 
body. It also sees opportunities for a common 
approach to WTO reform, mainly to improve the 
options for influencing China. Germany is inter-
ested in bringing a rapid end to the dispute over 
subsidies for aircraft manufacturers, Boeing and 
Airbus, and unlike the European Commission, it 
has been willing to give the new administration 
time to work out a position, without resorting 
to punitive tariffs. In Germany, there is still an 
interest in returning to negotiations on a broad 
trade agreement, although with a greater empha-
sis on agreeing common labour and environmental 
standards. The dispute over the taxation of global 
enterprises is likely to continue, which will hinder 
co-operation on business taxation reform within 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. Conflicts of interest will also emerge 
in the debate on the appropriate regulatory ap-
proach to technological development.
The coordination of policy towards China con-
stitutes a key element of the offer Germany has 
presented to the US13. At the same time, this issue 
13 See H. Maas,  ‘Es ist Zeit für einen transatlantischen 
Neuanfang’, Welt, 25 October 2020, www.welt.
de. Cf. N. Röttgen,  ‘Joe Bidens Wahlerfolg rückt die 
USA…’, op. cit.
From Berlin’s perspective, coordina-
tion of policy towards China will be 
a major challenge.
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is becoming one of the most serious challenges 
they are facing. Given the intensifying rivalry 
between China and the US, Germany has tried 
to avoid being forced to clearly side with the US. 
Berlin may be more ready to take a more decisive 
stance on this issue now, since it has become more 
critical about the Chinese government’s actions 
and sees the risk of China’s growing dominance in 
the Indo-Pacific region. However, economic inter-
ests will still determine its position towards China, 
whose potential for German business is believed 
to be more promising than the US market. The 
consequences of the pandemic crisis may further 
strengthen this view. As a result German politi-
cians, especially Christian Democrats, may make 
efforts to maintain a relative balance of security 
and economic interests. However, Germany will 
find it more difficult to avoid responding to US 
expectations, since the multilateral mechanisms 
and consultations that had been in abeyance under 
Trump will have resumed functioning. Germany 
will support the attempts by the EU and the US 
to agree on a common trade policy towards Chi-
na, and will also take action to reform the WTO 
to this end. However, it will be reluctant to bear 
both the political and economic consequences of 
Washington’s pressure on Beijing, which will not 
be eased by the Democrats, although at least it 
will result from other methods of action.
Despite the change in the White House, Nord 
Stream 2 and the US sanctions on this project, 
which Berlin has rejected as a manifestation of 
an “attack on European sovereignty”, will likely 
continue to put a strain on US-German relations. 
Germany made efforts to prevent any further 
tightening of the restrictions hoping that nego-
tiation conditions would improve in the event of 
victory for the Democrats. However, it was not 
assumed that the problem would be automati-
cally resolved, because Democrats and Republi-
cans alike have a negative assessment of the gas 
pipeline, and Congress strongly supports the 
continuation of economic pressure. Biden too 
adopted a critical stance on the German-Russian 
co-operation in this area (“a fundamentally bad 
deal for Europe”). However, Germany hopes that 
the future president, by focusing primarily on 
the normalisation of relations, will be reluctant 
to impose sanctions on his allies and that, unlike 
with Trump, the export of American LNG will not 
be a priority for him. Supporters of the pipeline 
are counting on the Democrats to be more open 
to their arguments. Germany may try to soften 
the American position, in particular as part of 
the coordination of Western states’ approach 
towards Russia which Biden has announced. Pos-
sible decisions to this end will be viewed as an 
indicator of the new administration’s attitude 
to co-operation with Germany. Moreover, if the 
planned reduction of the US military presence in 
Germany is revoked, this would be an analogous 
measure of the renewal of US-German relations 
from Berlin’s perspective.
Outlook
Biden’s presidency gives Germany time to adapt 
to changes in US policy and, more broadly, to the 
transformation of the international environment 
to more favourable conditions than those of-
fered by the Trump administration. However, this 
process – particularly with regard to the imple-
mentation of Germany’s declaration of greater 
engagement in reviving of the transatlantic part-
nership – will clash with German political reality.
As Angela Merkel’s long chancellorship nears its 
end, the race for the post of government leader 
has begun. The configuration of the coalition after 
next year’s Bundestag elections will have a decisive 
influence on future modifications of foreign and 
security policy. Considering the relatively short 
period left until the elections, it is unlikely that 
German politicians will want to make any major 
changes in external relations, especially given 
the all-consuming struggle with the economic 
and social consequences of the pandemic. For 
Chancellor Merkel, an auspicious start to co-oper-
ation with the new American administration could 
The upcoming election campaign 
will not contribute to a rational pub-
lic debate on Germany’s greater en-
gagement in the areas of security 
and defence.
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serve as a symbolic accomplishment crowning her 
achievements in the field of transatlantic relations, 
especially since one of her main goals when she 
took office was improving relations with the US. 
For Germany’s main political forces, however, 
the upcoming election will have an increasingly 
strong impact on how individual parties set their 
priorities. It is also possible that they will exploit 
the contentious issues in foreign policy in their 
political competition.
From Washington’s perspective, the actual in-
crease in Germany’s military contribution will 
prove how serious the German declarations are. At 
the same time, the upcoming election campaign 
will not contribute to a rational public debate on 
Germany’s greater involvement in the areas of 
security and defence. On the contrary, objections 
to a further increase in the defence budget should 
be expected; these will be justified in particular 
by the needs of the country’s healthcare and 
education systems. Likewise, attempts to expand 
German military commitments regarding conflicts 
in the EU’s neighbourhood may be heavily criti-
cised. There will be another stage of the debate 
on the deterrence policy within NATO and on 
German participation in nuclear sharing. The SPD 
will focus on the issues of arms control and dis-
armament policy. It is very likely that throughout 
the campaign the political parties will capitalise 
on the anti-American sentiments predominant 
among the German public which intensified during 
Trump’s presidency. One indicator of the tone of 
next year’s disputes may be the statements made 
by Rolf Mützenich, the chairman of the SPD par-
liamentary club, who has appealed for a stronger 
decoupling of Europe from the US.
Disillusionment with the United States may make 
Germany more open to the proposals for European 
autonomy formulated by President Emmanuel Ma-
cron. On the other hand, if US-German relations 
improve markedly, the differences of interests 
between Berlin and Paris may become more ap-
parent. In the debate on the need to strengthen 
co-operation between European states in the face 
of the changes in the international environment, 
tension will intensify between supporters of the 
synergistic concept of ‘strengthening Europe’ and 
the revival of transatlantic relations on the one 
hand, and supporters of European autonomy on 
the other.
